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Constitutional 
Technicalities 
in Criminal 
Tax Cases 
by Randy Bruce Blaustein 
Because taxation is a division of ac-
counting, it might seem at the outset, 
that the most basic of defenses available 
in a criminal tax case is to dispute the 
government's contention that the debits 
and credits were not reported correctly. 
As important as that defense might be, 
there are numerous cases in which, in-
stead, constitutional defenses are heav-
ily relied upon. This article focuses on a 
series of tax cases decided on constitu-
tional issues. 
The violation of a citizen's prescribed 
constitutional rights make invalid the in-
troduction of specific evidence in court. 
Administration of tax law is no excep-
tion; it is not uncommon to find that vio-
lations of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, among others, occur during the 
investigation of criminal tax matters. It is, 
of course, unrealistic to believe that con-
sideration of these issues will at all times 
be found valid. However, if successful, 
these violations may decide the case. 
One of the most basic of all tax ques-
tions is the fundamental legality of the 
tax system. In the case of W. C. [bug las, 
his objections to payment of income tax 
were two-fold: while contending that 
payment of tax may be used to anti-
American advantages, his major objec-
tion was the unconstitutionality of in-
come tax. This alleged unconstitutional-
ity was his sole justification for failure to 
file a tax retum. 
In a 1973 decision by the 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals. U.S. v. W. C. Douglas, 
476 F.2nd 260, the court held that the 
fact that the taxpayer willfully failed to 
file a return as a means of political protest 
was not a defense. The appellant, a med-
ical doctor, was a self-styled "super" 
patriot. Dr. Douglas's philosophy was 
that the federal government, because of 
the influence of certain communists or 
communist sympathizers, had given 
monetary and other forms of aid to 
enemies of the United States. He felt that 
to contribute to this aid by paying taxes 
would be treason. The taxpayer ad-
vocated the repeal of the Sixteenth 
Amendment because the income tax it-
self is unconstitutional. He, also, thought 
the tax to be illegally administered be-
cause it is not levied equally on all citi-
zens. 
For the years 1966 and 1967 Dr. 
Douglas filed a form 1040 with only his 
name, address, signature and the words 
"UNDER PROTEST" written across the 
face of the return. Section 7203 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which makes it 
a misdemeanor to willfully fail to file a tax 
return, supply information or pay tax, 
was found to be violated. 
Double jeopardy provides that no 
person shall be subject to prosecution for 
the same offense more than once. This 
defense was used by Joseph Page in his 
federal tax case. Prior to a federal in-
dictment being issued for tax evasion, 
Page entered a plea of guilty to New 
Yo~k State charges for making false and 
fraudulent tax returns. The same income 
tax data was used in the preparation of 
both returns. The taxpayer argued that 
the use of the same income tax data in 
the two sets of returns (federal and state) 
constituted a single offense. 
The District Court, 65-2 USTC 9582, 
made the analogy that the offenses were 
as distinct as two hold-ups with the same 
pistol. The defendant was not placed in 
double jeopardy. He was indicted both 
by the State of New York and the federal 
government for tax evasion for the same 
years, having committed two distinct 
crimes. The crimes had nothing in com-
mon, except the use of the same income 
tax data. 
The Sixth Amendent states in part that 
"[iln all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right...to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense." 
The 4th Circuit found in U.S. v. Hefner, 
420 F.2nd 809 (1970), thatthe appellant 
was deprived of such constitutional 
guarantee. Hefner had furnished false 
and fraudulent statements of federal in-
come tax withholding to his employer. 
When this situation was brought to the 
attention of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, special agents of the Intelligence 
DiviSion made a preliminary investiga-
tion and subsequently arranged for an 
interview with Hefner on two occasions. 
At the first interview he was advised by 
the agents that he was not required to 
furnish any information which might 
tend to incriminate him, and that any-
thing he said could be used against hirn. 
However, Hefner was not advised at 
either interview that he could retain 
counsel to assist him. 
The court's attention was focused on 
a narrower issue than the violation of a 
constitutional right; that issue being the 
failure of a government agency to 
scrupulously observe rules or proce-
dures which it has established. The pro-
cedure in question is contained in I.R.S. 
News Release #897, which stated in 
part that "[ilf the potential criminal as-
pects of the matter are not resolved by 
preliminary inquiries and further investi-
gation becomes necessary, the special 
agent is required to advise the taxpayer 
of his Constitutional rights to remain si-
lent and to retain counsel." 
The court concluded that the admis-
sion of a special agent's testimony con-
cerning incriminating statements made 
by a defendant at an interview without ' 
the agent having complied with pre-
scribed procedures was not permissible. 
The fact that the procedures established 
by the I.R.S. for protecting Constitutional 
rights of persons suspected of tax fraud 
during investigations were more gener-
ous than the Constitution required, and 
that the instructions were not prom-
ulagted in a formally labeled regulation, 
was of no significance. 
In a similar case, a woman who was 
engaged to the appellee informed the In-
telligence Division that her fiancee might 
be guilty of income tax evasion. She 
then proceeded to detail certain informa-
tion about business transactions, bank 
accounts, etc. As the information re-
ceived was vague the case was referred 
to the Audit Division to determine the 
existence of any additional tax liability. 
The revenue agent concluded that over 
$100,000 in income was not reported 
and that there were indications of fraud. 
The case was then routinely referred to 
the Intelligence Division which con-
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ducted a criminal investigation. 
The Court found, in U.S. v. Robson, 
477 F.2d 13 (1973), that where a re-
venue agent made the same type of civil 
audit that he conducted in all cases, re-
gardless of initial impetus from the In-
telligence Division, and that he had no 
interim conferences with Intelligence 
representatives, and was under no obli-
gation to report to them unless his audit 
uncovered an indication of fraud, no 
Miranda-type warnings were required. 
The fact that an informant's tip led to the 
audit originally and came from the Intel-
ligence Division did not mean that the 
revenue agent was an agent of the Intel-
ligence Division. Therefore, there was 
no violation of due process in the agent's 
failure to give warnings required to spe-
cial agents of the Intelligence Division. 
The lack of confidentiality between an 
accountant and his client was the issue in 
the case of Lillian Couch, since it even-
tually led to self-incrimination. In a re-
cent Supreme Court case, Couch v. 
U.S., No. 71-889, (Jan. 9, 1973), the 
petitioner claimed that her privilege 
against self-incrimination would be vio-
lated if an lR.S. summons requiring cer-
tain of her books and records in the pos-
session of her accountant was enforced. 
The court held that the summons should 
be enforced. The privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to a tax-
payer's records that were in the posses-
sion of her accountant even though she 
retained ownership. The privilege is per-
sonal and protects possession rather 
than ownership. Personal complusion 
against the taxpayer was lacking since 
the records were in the accountant's 
possession. In a related issue the court 
ruled that the taxpayer's claim that the 
confidential nature of the accountant-
client relationship gave rise to an expec-
tation of privacy, thus preventing pro-
duction of the records under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, was not recog-
nized. No confidential accountant-client 
privilege exists under federal law. 
Because there is no confidential 
accountant-client relationship, any at-
torney who retains an accountant during 
a fraud case should issue a formal re-
tainer letter. Other factors to protect the 
client would be for the accountant to be 
paid directly by the attorney and for an 
agreement to be written which states that 
the accountant's workpapers were the 
property of the attorney. The accountant 
would then be protected from compul-
sory disclosure of subsequent work-
sheets, communications and taxpayer's 
records. 
The examples cited above are only an 
indication of the realm from which de-
fenses may be drawn. Constitutional de-
fenses are basic even to tax cases and 
obviously should not be overlooked. 
Unfortunately, many of the decisions 
rendered in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
are not consistent among circuits; there-
fore, what might be considered uncon-
stitutional in one circuit may be accepta-
ble in another. 
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